David Beatty joined the Victorian Navy in 1884. His early career therefore occurred at a time of great technological, tactical and strategic challenges to the Royal Navy. In 1910 he was promoted to Rear Admiral, and from 1912 served as Naval Secretary to Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty. This role in turn led to his command of the Battle Cruiser Squadron, with which he entered the war. The early years of the war saw much frustration. There was also disappointment at the failure to bring about a decisive action with the German navy. The Battle of Jutland (May 1916) led to his often quoted comment, 'There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today'. Attempts to learn lessons from the battle - and attribute blame - would long outlast the war. In November 1916, Beatty was appointed Commander-in-Chief, with Jellicoe, his predecessor in this position, becoming First Sea Lord. His main concerns in this position included solving the problems revealed by Jutland, countering the U-boat threat, maintaining morale in the Royal Navy and prosecuting the increasingly effective blockade of Germany. For Beatty, the war ended triumphantly, with his receiving the surrender of the German fleet. In 1919, he became First Sea Lord and was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet and he retired in 1927. This volume spans the period up to the end of the First World War. The first section covers Beatty's career as a Captain, to set the context for the bulk of the volume, which focuses on the War itself. The Battle of Jutland is covered fairly briefly here, with Beatty's immediate reaction; his later thoughts can be found in Volume II (NRS Volume 132). The documents included have come mainly from Lord Beatty's personal collection (at the National Maritime Museum), but also from the Imperial War Museum and the archives of Churchill College, Cambridge. Official papers from the National Archive and the British Library are not included. Both the subject, and some individual documents, overlap with the Navy Record Society collections, Volume 108: The Jellicoe Papers, Volume I (1966) and Volume 111: The Jellicoe Papers, Volume II (1968), both edited by A Temple-Patterson.

The papers relating to Admiral Edward Vernon are intended to give an estimate of his contribution to naval strategy and tactics. They are divided between his command in the West Indies from 1739 and 1742 and command in the English Channel in 1745. Preparation for war with Spain was made in June 1739 and Vernon was appointed admiral in July with orders for the West Indies. The government Opposition favoured not just protection of trade but also the capture of Cuba. Vernon had plans for this course of action but on arrival found the timing was wrong and subsequently this was beyond the army's ability. Dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of land forces command is clearly shown in the documents. He arrived at Port Royal in October and was off Porto Bello in November ready with clear and precise orders issued to his captains. Preparation, training and signals, additional to the Fighting Instructions, marked him as an effective administrator as also did the strengthening of Port Royal as a naval base. His success at Porto Bello showed him to be effective in action as well as good commander of men and resources. In 1742 the threat of invasion from France, in support of the Jacobites, was again a time of need and Vernon was appointed admiral in command of a Channel squadron. He did not refrain from criticising the inadequate and inappropriate forces at his disposal. The Admiralty eventually took up his proposed strategy, yet the picture of a disgruntled man is clear.